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Mental
states are caused by and realized in the structure of the brain. So, 3. Any system that produces mental states must have (causal) powers equivalent to those of the human brain.
4. Digital computer programs by themselves are never sufficient to produce mental states. So, 5. The way the brain produces a mind cannot be by simply instantiating a computer program.
So, 6. If you want to build a machine to produce mental states, then it cannot be designed to do so solely in virtue of its instantiating a certain computer program.
I think that this argument is both valid and sound. Premises one and two seem incontrovertibly true. Searle's arguments in MBP are intended to establish the truth of step four in the above argument and I think they succeed. In order to more fully understand Searle's positive view, however, I will briefly address the salient points of the refutation of strong AI.
The focal point of the debate in question is whether computers can ever achieve cognitive states strictly in virtue of their programs. That is, can a computer achieve any intentional state merely by appropriate programming?
The strong AI researcher's claim is yes, and Searle's claim is no. An intentional state of mind is a state that can be described with sentences beginning with "I believe that," "I understand," "I desire that," etc.
They are states of mind that are described by Searle as representing objects and states of affairs.* In this discussion, as mentioned earlier, the intentional state being considered is that of understanding.
The question to be answered is, in virtue of what is the brain the focus of intentionality? Searle and his opponents agree that the brain is the part of the human anatomy that is the source or focus of intentional states, but they disagree about what characteristic of the brain it is that allows it to fulfill this function.
The claim of the researchers in strong AI is that the brain is the focus of intentionality in virtue of the programs it realizes. Therefore, anything that can instantiate a program can achieve intentional states. Consequently, computers, in virtue of their ability to instantiate programs, can achieve cognitive states. It should be noted that for the purposes of this discussion, a computer is defined as any thing or collection of things that is stable enough and complex enough to accurately instantiate a program.
This could be an anthill, some toilet paper and stones, an IBM 360, or a collection of beer cans. All of these things (and many others as well) are, or could be made, complex enough to instantiate a variety of computer programs since all that is needed is a structure capable of maintaining certain relationships for an extended period of time. The thesis of strong AI, then, is that: 1) appropriately programmed computers literally have cognitive states, and 2) the programs thereby explain human cognitive states. To use the language of dualism, the strong AI researcher wants to claim that mind is to brain as program is to hardware, i.e., in both relations the former is independent of the latter although the latter is needed to instantiate the former.
Searle refers to one of the examples used in strong AI to clarify this thesis. The example is from Schank and Abelson's Scripts Plans Goals and Understanding.* Schank and Abelson develop several programs that fit into the following scenario.
1. The computer is given representative knowledge (a script) intended to be equivalent to what a normal human being would know about the situation in question, e.g., eating in a restaurant.
2.
The computer is then given a story about a particular situation, e.g., John ordering a hamburger. 3. The computer is then "asked" questions about the story. These questions commonly refer to things not explicitly stated in the story but which could be derived from the story by anyone (anything) with basic knowledge about restaurants.
4. The computer then answers these questions in a manner we would expect from a human being in similar circumstances.
From this Searle claims (and rightly so) that the supporters of strong AI draw the following conclusions: 1) that the machine can literally be said to understand the story and provide answers to the questions, and
2) that what the machine and its programs do explains the human ability to understand the story and answer questions about it.
From this we can extract a clear and basic thesis indicative of strong AI for the intentional state of, in this case, understanding a natural language. Such a thesis is: S understands P in the case where, given P as input, S realizes a program X which enables S to produce responses which are absolutely indistinguishable from that of a native speaker of the language to which P belongs. Therefore, according to strong AI, the intentional state of understanding all or part of a natural language is achieved when the appropriate program is realized.
In other words, S's realizing a program X is sufficient for S to uunderstand P.
In this case, the computer program X would have to be such that given P, plus other linguistic data, S The basic point being made by Searle in these conclusions is that the computer plus program cannot understand anything strictly in virtue of its program, because all this amounts to is giving the computer "syntax" but no "semantics.
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As Searle notes, The computer attaches no meaning, interpretation, or content to the formal symbols, and qua computer it couldn't, because if we tried to give the computer an interpretation of its symbols (semantics) we could only give it more uninterpreted symbols. The computer manipulates formal symbols but attaches no meaning to them ....
9
This is the point made by Searle's demon: he manipulates the formal Chinese symbols, but he doesn't understand them because they have, for Searle's demon, no meaning. And for the supporters of strong AI who wish to claim that even if the Chinese symbols are not understood, the symbolism internal to the machine (the machine language, i.e., Searle's demon's ability to understand the English instruction book) is understood, John Heil has a response in "Does Cognitive Psychology Rest on a Mistake?" that appears consistent with Searle's position.
It appears, for example, that the sense in which we might want to say that the internal 'machine language' of a digital computer is symbolic--the sense, that is, in which it could be said to have meaning (semantics)-is parasitic on its relation to a suitable programming language, and the sense of this language, in turn, dependent on its application by a suitable, language using programmer.
The programmer provides an essential link between the states of the machine and the states of affairs in the world to which the former •refer' .
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This relationship between program and programmer can also be used to explain why programmers and researchers in strong AI describe their machines as having intentional states. It is due to the fact that it is obvious to the programmers that the machine has all the necessary information to arrive at the correct answers to their questions. They do not pause to consider that the replies of the computer have no meaning as far as the computer is concerned, but are being interpreted as meaningful by the programmers themselves. This is the distinction that Searle draws between "intrinsic" intentionality and "observer-relative" intentionality. The researchers in strong AI interpret their input into the computer (scripts, stories, and questions) as having meaning, and they ascribe intrinsic intentionality to the computer. But the case of Searle's demon illustrates that all that really obtains is observerrelative intentionality.
The computer cannot and does not have intentional states (understanding) strictly in virtue of its program.
It has nothing but a bunch of uninterpreted formal symbols and instructions as to how to manipulate symbols, i.e., a syntax but no semantics.
Searle goes on to consider a series of possible replies to his critique of strong AI. For the specifics the reader is referred to MBP.
In all of the replies addressed, Searle can accomodate the modified situation into the Searle's demon thought-experiment.
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In all of the replies, Searle's demon could run the whole operation and not understand anything. We would certainly want to ascribe intentional states to such unified entities that some of the replies suggest, but it would be a case of observer-relative intentionality. As before, we would realize upon a close examination that Searle's demon is merely processing uninterpreted symbols and, once again, he has syntax, but still no semantics.
A close examination of Searle's response to the various replies reveals the following conclusions:
1) The strong AI thesis does not offer the sufficient condition for understanding that it claimed to offer. At best, it is a qualified sufficient condition and it may not even be a necessary condition.
2) Because the thesis of the Combination Reply (as well as some of the other replies) is a brain simulation thesis, the philosophically interesting aspect of the intitial thesis, i.e., mind as independent of brain characteristics, has been sacraficed.
3) Therefore, digital computer programs by themselves are never sufficient to produce mental states (premise four of the main argument).
II THE CAUSAL POWERS OF THE BRAIN
Since Searle does not come out and explicitly present his own view of intentional states, I will offer a version that Searle could accept based on what he does say.
If Searle ever really presents his own thesis, it seems to be "that intentional states processes, and events are precisely that: states, processes, and events.
The point is that they are both caused by and realized in the structure of the brain." i.e., the sight of a tree would not be due to a causal chain starting with an actual tree, proceeding through the eye and optic nerve, and ending in the appropriate part of the brain.
Instead, some other stimulation of the brain itself would result in the appearance of a "tree." It is the internal states of the brain (its intrinsic intentionality) that are important, not the impingement of the causally related external world that those of us on the "outside" are aware of (observer-relative intentionality). and try to show that Searle's views support this argument.
Having the same causal powers as the human brain
is sufficient for having intentional states. argues that what is happening is that such an approach virtually eliminates the importance of the "primitive processors" in the brain and focuses instead on the formal description or re-presentation of the processes generated by these processors.
If B (a non-human brain) exercises its causal powers in the very
In either case, we end up with a syntax without semantics. As Searle suggests, "if the simulation of the causes (of intentional states) is at a low enough level to reproduce the causes (as with the microchip or "primitive processor") and not merely describe them (as in a program), the 'simulation' will reproduce the effects." 2 ' Thus, we can see that the notion of functioning in the same mechanistic way as the human brain is liberal enough to admit non-carbon-based neurophysiology and yet narrow enough to exclude all the things (anthills, bunches of beer cans, etc.) which can only instantiate a digital computer program.
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The fourth premise is basically an empirical claim to the effect that the mechanism of the human brain is biological and electro-chemical in nature.
The conclusion of this argument follows from the premises as interpreted above. The notion of having to interact electrically in a way analogous to the human brain has been addressed in the discussion of premise three. However, this conclusion might be more conservative than is necessary. That is, it seems conceivable that an entity could exist whose component mental parts interact magnetically or optically, and we would still want to claim that if they had the appropriate causal powers, they would also have intentionality.
It seems apparent, however, that if we can admit electromagnetic interaction to replace electro-chemical interaction, then we could also admit magnetic and optical interaction without any serious harm to the argument.
We would still be able to exclude digital computers based on magnetics or optics that only instantiate programs because it would still be an empirical question as to whether such a system could, in fact, reproduce causal powers like those in the human brain.
In this way, the above interpretaion of the causal argument based on Searle's various claims admits what it seems reasonable to admit to the class of "things with intentional states" while excluding all those things that were shown to be inadmissable by virtue of Searle's demon.
Ill

CONCLUSIONS
This discussion has been an attempt to expose the pertinent characteristics of the two views being considered.
The difference between the two ultimately turns on how the brain can be the focus of intentional states.
For the researchers in strong AI, the brain produces intentional states in virtue of its instantiation of formal programs. For Searle, the brain produces intentionality in virtue of its causal powers and properties.
As mentioned above, the difference seems to have its source in the relative priority being placed on the "primitive processors" and the processes as represented by programs.
For the researcher in strong AI, the "primitive processor" (the brain's neurophysiology) is of no importance as can be seen in what can be called a "digital computer." Instead, the researchers are examining the mental processes by questioning and observing human beings in action. From what they observe, they construct a formal program that can take the same symbolic input (words) as the brain qua person, and gives back the same output (words) as the brain qua person. Their claim is that if this is done with ade-guate attention to detail, the program created and instantiated in any capable mechanism must achieve the same cognitive states as those observed by the researchers in human subjects. Searle claims this is a gross error because the neurophysiology of the brain is not irrelevant to the analysis of intentional states. Furthermore, since the researchers are (so to speak) on the outside looking in, their ascribing of intentionality to the computer instantiating the program is merely a case of observer-relative intentionality.
The causal argument has shown that intrinsic intentionality is exposed by an empirical examination to determine whether the entity in question possesses the appropriate causal powers. But for the researcher in strong AI, the formal relations and structures are constructed through observation and theory, and the data (uninterpreted symbols for the computer, interpreted as words by the researchers) is fitted into this structure. The formal structure precedes the data being related.
If you will, the syntax is created by the researchers prior to the semantics, the semantics which never arrives. This is what happens, according to the causal argument, when the formal descriptions of human behavior capable of instantiation by digital computer are given priority over the actual, physical primitive processors that make up the human brain.
According
to the causal argument, the perspective and the priority are just the opposite. The intrinsic intentionality of the brain is realized in virtue of the causal relations that exist between the primitive processors of the brain. Whatever the precise causal characteristics of the brain are (however the brain acutally works), they are sufficient to produce intentional states. These characteristics cannot exist soley in the formal, observer-described relations represented in the structure of the brain, so it must be something mechanistically inherent to the brain (but not tied to its particular biochemistry) that accounts for the presence of intentional states.
In the causal argument, the primitive processors entering into these formal relations exist prior to the relations. Consequently, we must give priority to these primitive processors rather than to the formal relations we recognize (after the fact).
In this case, the semantics exists before the "observed" syntax.
In summary, the relevant difference between the position of strong AI and the causal argument is that the former is based on the formal structure of programs that turn out to be empty of anything to relate and the latter is based on the causal relation and characteristics of the brain which at this point we know to be sufficient for intentional states, but which may at this time be indescribable beyond their being mechanistically grounded.
For (1982). In this paper, Block is concerned with the cognitive science interpretation of the pictorial and descriptive analyses of mental imagery. What is relevant here is that Block concludes that even cognitive scientists of the sort who would embrace strong AI must accept that there are primitive processors which cannot be described by representations, but must be explained nomologically (see p. 26). Consequently, the question becomes one of which is more crucial, the representational descriptions or the primitive processors. Block claims that we must place much more emphasis on the primitive processors as analog devices (pp. 39-41); and that is the same point Searle is trying to make, even more fervently, when he says we cannot ignore the neurophysiology of the brain in favor of formal programs alone. 
